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| Jones Act Federal Circuits' & State Decisions - 6th Circuit | |||||||
| Tuesday, 19 May 2009 20:56 | |||||||
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Case Name: Kris William Denson v Ingram Barge Co. Date of Judgment: 16th April 2009 Court: U.S.D.C. - W.D. Kentucky Judge: Chief District Judge Russell Citation: 2009 WL 1033817 (W.D.Ky.) Background: Plaintiff, Kris William Denson ("Employee") sued defendant, Ingram Barge Co. ("Employer") for injuries caused while working on employer's barge.
The employee's duties were to clean coal from the tops of the barge combing to the barges' outer walkways. On March 21, 2006, as the employee was walking to the stern of the barge, he put his hand out to keep from falling. The barge shifted and the employee's hand was crushed. As a result, he suffered severe injuries and lost a finger. The employee brought suit under the Jones Act. In the alternative, he alleged a claim pursuant to the Longshore and Harborworkers Compensation Act ("LHWCA"). Employer countered that the employee cannot recover under the Jones Act because he was not a seaman. He also argued that the employee could not recover under the LHWCA and moved for summary judgment. Issue: (1) Whether the employee was a seaman; and (2) if the employee was a seaman, whether he can recover under the Jones Act; or in the alternative, the LHWCA. Held: (1) The Supreme Court held there are two requirements for seaman status. They are (a) that an employee's duties strongly contribute to the functioning of the vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission, and (b) that the employee must have a substantial connection to a vessel in navigation. This Court added a third requirement: the employee must be subjected to the perils of the sea. The Court finds that the employee was not a seaman because he did not meet the test set out by the Supreme Court. Employee's duties did contribute to the functioning of the vessel, but the contribution was minimal. As well, the employee did not have a substantial connection to the vessel. His duties were to clean the barge. Once he completed his work, he would move on to another barge. The employee also failed to meet the third requirement. His duties did subject him to hazards, but not those faced by seamen. Thus, the employee was deemed a land-based maritime employee. The Jones Act will not be applied. It is reserved for sea-based maritime employees whose work regularly exposes them to the hazards of vessels. Therefore, the seaman was not an intended beneficiary of the Jones Act. (2) The employee claims the employer violated the LHWCA when he failed to provide a safe workplace, adequate safety measures, and to sufficiently secure the vessel. The employer countered that these were claims for unseaworthiness, which is barred by the LHWCA. The employer's motion for summary judgment was denied. Both parties' arguments were undeveloped and conclusory. More information from both sides must be presented to the Court before a proper decision over the LHWCA claim can be made. Significance: The Jones Act provides that a seaman who is injured in the course of employment may bring suit against his employer. For those who are land-based maritime workers, a suit may be brought under the LHWCA. Thus, the decision on whether to apply the Jones Act or LHWCA rests on whether the employee is a seaman. The question of who is a seaman is measured by a reasonable person standard. When the facts are undisputed, the Courts look to whether reasonable persons, applying the proper legal standard, could differ as to whether the employee was a seaman. If they could, then the jury will decide. If they could agree, summary judgment will be given. The Supreme Court devised a two-part test to determine seaman status. (1) An employee's duties must contribute to the functioning of the vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission, and (2) the employee must have a substantial connection to a vessel in navigation that is substantial in terms of both its duration and nature. The Supreme Court explained that "the fundamental purpose of the substantial connection requirement is to separate the sea-based maritime employees who are entitled to Jones Act protection from those land-based workers who have only a transitory or sporadic connection to a vessel in navigation, and therefore whose employment does not regularly expose them to the perils of the sea." Steve Gordon http://www.offshoreinjuries.com
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