Background: This case arose out of injuries sustained by the plaintiff, Chad Alex, while aboard the M/V Toisa Proteus. The vessel was allegedly owned by the defendant, Newfield Exploration Company.

Alex was employed by Longnecker Properties, Inc. ("Longnecker") as a rigger from November 2005 until December 2006.  On November 19, 2006, Alex was working when the vessel's crane dropped a personnel basket onto his right hand. Alex further alleged that on December 11, 2006, he was performing his duties when the vessel's crane block struck an unsecure staircase, causing the staircase to flip over and strike Alex. He suffered injuries to his ribs, shoulders, neck and back.

Alex sued pursuant to the Jones Act and general maritime law. He sought maintenance and cure, attorney's fees, past and future earning capacity and other damages from all defendants. Alex later amended his complaint to add Sealion Shipping Limited, the operator of the vessel, and Toisa Limited, the owner of the vessel as defendants.

The defendants answered and denied liability. Longnecker filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that Alex did not meet the requirements for Jones Act status as a matter of law. Longnecker contended that Alex did not have a substantial connection to a single vessel in navigation or to an identifiable fleet of vessels. Finally, Longnecker claimed that Alex failed to show that at least 30% of the time was spent on Longnecker's vessels, and he therefore was ineligible for seaman status.

In response, Alex filed a motion for summary judgment contending he met the requirements for seaman status. He asserted there was no requirement that a Jones Act employer be the owner of a vessel on which a Plaintiff is employed. He further argued that at least 30 percent of his time was spent working as a rigger aboard a single vessel, the M/V Toisa Proteus.

Issue: Whether a plaintiff is eligible for seaman status where at least 30 percent of his time is spent on a vessel under the common ownership or control of an entity that is not his employer.

Held:

The Supreme Court has established that seaman status requires (1) that the plaintiff's employment duties contribute to the function of a vessel or the accomplishment of a vessel's mission, and (2) that the plaintiff have a connection to a vessel in navigation that is substantial in duration and nature (Harbor Tug and Barge Co. v Papai, 520 U.S. 548 (1997).

The parties did not dispute whether Alex's work contributed to the function of the vessel. Therefore, the second element was in question. Both parties agreed that a worker who spends less than about 30 percent of his time in the service of a single vessel should not qualify as a seaman under the Jones Act.

This Court held that the uncontested facts demonstrated Alex spent more than 30 percent of his time in service to a single vessel. Thus, Alex had a connection to a vessel in navigation that was substantial in terms of both its duration and nature. It was irrelevant whether the 30 percent of time was spent on employer's vessel or another vessel. Therefore, Alex's motion for summary judgment was granted. Longnecker's motion for summary judgment was denied.

Comments:

The purpose of the Supreme Court's test from Harbor Tug is to separate the sea-based maritime employees who are entitled to Jones Act protection from those land-based workers who have only a transitory or sporadic connection with a vessel in navigation. Those who have land-based employment are not regularly exposed to the perils of the sea.

Land-based workers are eligible to recover under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act ("LHWCA").

Steve Gordon
http://www.offshoreinjuries.com